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Abstract 
Looking back on the challenge posed to critical theory by the publication in 1999 of Sokal and 
Bricmont’s book, Intellectual Impostures, this essay argues that the latter was at least evidence of the ongoing 
vitality of the French public sphere, thirty years after most of the books indicted in it had been published. 
Throwing light on the French political context in which they appeared, specifically the events of May ’68, it 
then tries to assess the reasons why events of similar import in contemporary Ireland and Northern Ireland have 
not prompted the same level of debate, and points out the want of a real Irish public sphere as one possible 
cause.  
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Résumé 
Revenant sur la parution en 1999 de l’ouvrage de Sokal et Bricmont, Impostures intellectuelles, et sur 
le défi critique que celui-ci a constitué, cet article avance l’idée selon laquelle un tel livre était au moins la 
preuve de la vitalité persistante de la sphère publique française, plus de trente ans après que les essais 
incriminés aient été publiés. Si l’on compare le contexte politique français dans lequel ces essais furent publiés, 
notamment les événements de mai 68, et le contexte récent en Irlande et en Irlande du Nord, où des événements 
de signification semblable se sont produits, on peut s’interroger sur les raisons qui font que ces derniers n’ont 
pas donné lieu à des débats d’un même niveau : l’absence d’une véritable sphère publique irlandaise est 
avancée comme l’une des causes possibles. 
Mots-clés : Impostures intellectuelles, France, Irlande, sphère publique, rôle de l’intellectuel  
 
 
 
Early in 1996 the journal Social Text published “Transgressing the Boundaries: 
Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity”, by Alan Sokal, Professor of 
Physics at New York University. This article was a fabricated pastiche of contemporary 
theoretical jargon, which suggested that, among other things, the teaching of science and 
mathematics should be “purged of its authoritarian and elitist characteristics, and the content 
of these subjects enriched by incorporating the insights of the feminist, queer, multiculturalist 
and ecological critiques.
1” Sokal later collaborated with Jean Bricmont, Professor of Mathem
 
1 Alan Sokal, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity”, 
Social Text 46/47 (1996), p. 230. 
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atics at the University of Louvain in Belgium, in a book-length critique of what they termed 
“postmodern philosophers’ abuse of science”, published in French in 1997, in English a year 
later. Entitled Intellectual Impostures
2
, this book contained only a very brief discussion of 
Lyotard, whole chapters on Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Baudrillard, Deleuze and Guattari, but 
nothing substantial on Lévi-Strauss or Barthes, Foucault or Derrida. Sokal and Bricmont’s 
main target was the supposedly widespread notion among English-speaking devotees of 
French theory that “modern science is nothing more than a ‘myth’, a ‘narration’ or a ‘social 
construction’, among many others.3” By citing these postmodern theorists as intellectual 
imposters, these writer were making the point that there were correct and, in their view, 
incorrect ways of commenting on contemporary socio-political and cultural events, and 
whether one agrees with this or not, what is taken for granted by Sokal and Bricmont is that 
there is a need to define and analyse the contribution of these intellectual imposters and to 
demonstrate why they are imposters. The core point seems to be that by transposing the 
disciplinary and hermeneutical modes from literary analysis to that of science, these 
intellectuals are imposters as their level of knowledge is not commensurate with the 
disciplines involved.  It is an attempt to regulate the contributions of intellectuals within the 
French public sphere, and to analyse the role of the intellectual therein.   
A parallel exercise which attempted to analyse the role of the intellectual in the Irish 
public sphere would require either a very powerful microscope or a great deal of imagination.  
Indeed, to look for the Irish public sphere itself would require a similar exercise in micro-
imaging-technology and imagination. Granted, Ireland has produced scholars who from time 
to time comment across different areas of activity such as Joe Lee or Declan Kiberd, but by 
and large, there is not a broad tradition of intellectual input into the broader social or cultural 
sphere. If we define an intellectual as one who writes outside of his or her chosen discipline, 
and who, by transposing paradigms of a specific discipline, acts as a type of public 
commentator on social and cultural mores, then Ireland is, and has been, in the grip of an 
intellectual recession as dire and difficult as the current fiscal recession for quite some time. 
The investment of intellectual capital outside of disciplinary areas is very much absent from 
Irish discourse. Indeed the existence of an Irish public sphere is itself open to question. There 
are, it is true, a number of Summer Schools such as the Magill or Merriman Schools, but even 
the seasonal title of these makes the point that the Irish public sphere is not a year-round 
phenomenon. If we look at contemporary cultural debate, the Irish public sphere
 
2 Sokal and Bricmont’s original title was Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science, 
New York, Picador, 1998. 
3 Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern Philosophers’ Abuse of Science, London, 
Profile Books, 1999, p. x. 
103 
 
 is a barren place indeed. Where is the intellectual debate around the Ryan Report on clerical 
abuse, or on the current credit crisis, its causes and ramifications for the capitalist system as 
we know it, or the status of republicanism in Ireland now that there is peace in Northern 
Ireland, or the ideological positions of the political parties in Ireland or the nature and demise 
of the Celtic Tiger? If we leave aside journalists like Fintan O’Toole, Eoin Harris and John 
Waters, then we are left looking for intellectual input. Talk radio, most notably the Newstalk 
station, has come to the fore in encouraging debate about contemporary issues, and the 
journalist Vincent Brown, in his current affairs programme on the TV3 television station, is 
also engaged in an ongoing robust critique of state institutions. The late Conor Cruise 
O’Brien was the last presiding intellectual presence in Irish public life, and his rigorous 
unpacking of nationalist and republican ideology, in a specifically Irish context, was 
paradigm-changing in terms of the attitudes of a large number of Irish people, and there has, 
as yet, been little to replace him, though Michael Cronin is perhaps the heir apparent to this 
role in that his discourse ranges across a number of disciplines. There have been a number of 
commentators of an economic leaning who have come to the fore in the recent recession-
driven discourse – David McWilliams, Eddie Hobbs and George Lee (recently elected to Dáil 
Éireann in a bye-election for the Fine Gael party) – but these people comment on matters 
financial and seem to see social and cultural issues as a distraction of the superstructure when 
we should all be examining the base, to use a Marxist paradigm. 
But before we examine why France seems to have a flourishing public sphere and 
Ireland does not, it is first necessary to explore some aspects of the very concept of a public 
sphere. The term derives from the work of, Jürgen Habermas, the neo-Marxist thinker of the 
Frankfurt School.His first book, The Structural Transformation in the Public Sphere, 
appeared in 1962 and it explored the emergence of the public sphere between the eighteenth 
and twentieth centuries. He saw it as a process of ongoing debate between equals. It “cannot 
be conceived as an institution and certainly not as an organisation”, writes Habermas, rather it 
is “a network for communicating information and points of view.4” The public sphere is 
where ideas and information are shared – outside of the pressures of the economic or political 
system.  It is where public opinions are formed as a result of communication. Hannah Arendt 
sees this public sphere as a liminal state, between the private world and the public world. It is 
a “social space” which is “neither private nor public, strictly speaking, a relatively new 
phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age and which found 
its 
 
4 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996, p. 360. 
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political form in the nation-state.
5” The major institutions which gave rise to the public 
sphere included the salons in France, the learned and literary societies in Germany and the 
coffee houses in England. Habermas traced the historical evolution of the institutions of 
public opinion through to their apparent decline in the modern social-welfare state, where 
state and society penetrate each other. Initially, the various communications media could help 
generate the public sphere as articles in newspapers or pamphlets often precipitated 
discussions, but their later commercialization and trivialization brought about the rapid 
decline and “refeudalization6” of the public sphere. As Habermas notes, when the mass media 
draw their material from “powerful, well-organised information producers” and “as long as 
they prefer media strategies that lower rather than raise the discursive level of public 
communication, issues will tend to start in and be managed from, the centre rather than 
follow a spontaneous course originating in the periphery.
7” 
The public sphere, therefore, is not umbilically related to any specific mode of 
production or communication. For Habermas, a reasoned disagreement is the basic point of 
departure for the modern public sphere and his discourse theory of democracy “privileges a 
strong procedural distinction between culture and the political.
8” Thus it is an idealized space 
in a way, a space of debate, close to the Kantian sensus communis, which is related to 
economic and political interests but not constituted by them. The term sensus communis is 
used by Kant in his Third Critique to indicate not merely the sense of being part of society, 
but rather a special sense that fits us into a human community. It is a specifically community 
sense because “communication and speech depend upon it, and without communication we 
could neither constitute nor enter into a community.
9” As Terry Eagleton has noted, it is no 
longer the social power of individuals but the way in which “they are constituted as 
discoursing subjects by sharing in a consensus of universal reason.
10” Now while the status of 
universal reason has become problematic in the light of deconstructive, postmodern and post-
Marxist thinking, nevertheless this quotation holds true in terms of defining the 
epistemological status of the public sphere. And I would agree with Žižek here in terms of the 
definition of the ‘universal’, which is not  an identification with an “all-encompassing global 
Substance” but rather, the identification with “a universal ethico-political 
 
5 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, introduction by Margaret Canovan, 2nd ed., Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1998, p. 28. 
6 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1989, p. 231. 
7 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 360. 
8 Greg Marc Nielsen, The Norms of Answerability Social Theory between Bakhtin and Habermas, foreword by 
Caryl Emerson, New York, State University of New York Press, 2002, p. 2.  
9 Maurizio Passerin D’entrèves, “Arendt’s Theory of Judgment”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah 
Arendt, ed. Dana R. Villa, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006,  pp. 245-260, p. 252 
10 Terry Eagleton, The Function of Criticism: From ‘The Spectator’ to Post-Structuralism, London, Verso, 
1996, p. 9. 
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principle – a universal religious collective, a scientific collective, a global revolutionary 
organization, all of which are in principle accessible to everyone”: 
This is what Kant, in the famous passage of “What Is Enlightenment?”, means by “public” as 
opposed to “private”: “private” is not individual as opposed to communal ties, but the very 
communal-institutional order of one’s particular identification; while “public” is the 
transnational universality of the exercise of one’s Reason. The paradox is thus that one 
participates in the universal dimension of the “public” sphere precisely as a singular 
individual extracted from or even opposed to one’s substantial communal identification – one 
is truly universal only as radically singular, in the interstices of communal identities11. 
For James Tully, a public sphere of “free speech, assembly and dissent” is vital in terms of an 
informed citizenship if people are not to “submit uncritically to the socialisation and media 
glorification of a life of negative freedom and private consumption.
12” As Habermas has 
observed, “reasoned argumentation, not the status or authority of the speaker, was to be the 
sole arbiter in debate
13”; nothing was to be protected from criticism, as reasoned critique was 
allowed to compete with the feudal authority of the church and the court as an arbiter of 
opinion, and finally the norms of the public sphere were intolerant of all cliquish inclinations 
in which merely private interests might seek to assert their combined weight and influence. 
The issues discussed “became ‘general’ not merely in their significance, but also in their 
accessibility: everyone had to be able to participate.
14” In other words, it is a sphere where 
issues of public importance are debated and discussed in a manner that is untrammelled by 
the bonds of discipline or of political allegiance.  
It is clear, then, that the relationship between the public sphere and the economic and 
political sphere is not simple, but nevertheless it is essential in a modern democratic culture 
as a bridge between the public and private. In contemporary postmodern culture, there is a 
media-sphere or cyber-sphere which are aspects of the public sphere as communication has 
now entered into these new modalities. Thus the internet can be a development of the salon or 
periodical and, as Calbrese and Borchert have pointed out, instances of cyberdemocracy have 
existed and will continue to exist. Whether they are random, institutionalised or 
commonplace is perhaps “not what is most important about democracy.15” In
 
11 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2006, p. 10. 
12 James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key, vol. II: Imperialism and Civic Freedom, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 54. 
13 Habermas, The Structural Transformation, p. 37. 
14 Ibid., p. 52. 
15 Andrew Calabrese and Mark Borchert, “Prospects for Electronic Democracy in the United States: Rethinking 
Communication and Social Policy’, Media, Culture & Society 18 (1996), pp. 49-268, p. 264. 
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 this sense, cyberdemocracy and the mediasphere have the potential to enable the public 
sphere as they can facilitate an equality of communication
16
, but there is always the 
possibility that they will become feudalised in the sense of becoming a hierarchically-driven 
vehicle for the transmission of a hegemonic view as opposed to a place where there can be 
intellectual communication and critique of society, economics and politics. 
So, as my purpose here is to look at examples of the French public sphere and to 
compare and contrast this with an Irish public sphere, then on the basis of my opening 
paragraph, this should be a very brief article.  However, I propose instead to attempt to learn 
from the French example of how a public sphere can be created which allows for the input of 
intellectual ideas, and more importantly for an informed intellectual critique of the political 
and social spheres, and I will then offer a theoretical, and I hope intellectual, assessment of 
the Irish socio-political situation, and of how we got to the present impasse, and a putative 
solution to the current problems.  I do not expect that there will be universal agreement with 
my ideas but if in the space of this journal, I can initiate a debate on the correct ordering and 
organisation of an Irish public sphere, then I will feel that my work has been done. 
 
 
French theory and the public sphere 
 
To say that the French public sphere is super-saturated in terms of intellectual input 
would be a truism. One could list out a number of intellectuals who have helped to transform 
the global public sphere let alone the French one, but two examples will suffice to make this 
clear, a very positive one and the other an oddly negative one. To begin with the positive, 
much has been made of the influence of French intellectual writings on raising student 
consciousness in Paris in 1968. The student uprisings of May 1968 in Paris, and those in 
Prague and Los Angeles of the same year, were to some extent inspired by French intellectual 
thought, most notably by those thinkers belonging to the “French theory” circle17. In 1966, 
Jacques Lacan’s Écrits18 and Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences were published
19. Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology 
 
16 John Hartley, Popular Reality: Journalism, Modernity and Popular Culture, London, Arnold, 1996, passim. 
17 For a French perspective on the subject, see François Cusset, French Theory – Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & 
Cie et les mutations de la vie intellectuelle aux Etats-Unis, Paris, La Découverte, 2003, passim. 
18 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, Paris, Seuil, 1966; Écrits – A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, London, Tavistock, 1977; 
Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink, in collaboration with Héloïse Fink and Russell 
Grigg. New York, Norton, 2006.  
19 Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les choses, Paris, Gallimard, 1966; The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York, Random House, 1970. 
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was published the following year
20
. These three texts asked seminal questions about the 
nature of culture and human organisations, questions which would prove to have a 
destabilising and largely emancipatory force on the discourses of the human sciences. The 
literary and theoretical origins of much of les événements has been traced in a recent article 
by Jean-Michel Rabaté in Parrhesia. Discussing Michel de Certeau’s La Prise de Parole: 
pour une nouvelle culture
21
, a book about the May uprising in Paris in 1968, Rabaté notes 
that:  
Like most commentators, de Certeau noted the somewhat nostalgic mode of many May 
slogans – along with the practice of heaping up paving stones to make barricades, a hangover 
from the Paris insurrections in the 1830s, 1848 and 1871. The Paris Commune, with its blend 
of anarchism, utopian socialism and neo-Marxism was a dominant utopia in 1968. This is 
why most of the mottos had a quotational air and knowingly returned to the slogans of 
Spanish anarchists during the civil war, the jokes of Dadaists, or the neo-Romantic tags of the 
Surrealists. It was also obvious that quite a few slogans came from Lacan’s teachings, 
including the word jouissance that was spreading on all the walls of Paris22. 
Indeed, “jouissez sans entraves” was one of the slogans of les événements as is revealed in 
the famous photograph taken by Henri Cartier-Bresson
23
. Lacan, developing the work of 
Freud, undercut the notion of rationality as the dominant factor in our humanity and instead 
began to examine language as an index of the unconscious processes of the mind. He also 
coined the phrase that the “unconscious is structured like a language24”, which brought the 
study of structures to the fore in continental thought. For Lacan, the unconscious and 
language could no longer be seen as givens, or as natural; instead, they were structures which 
required investigation. In this model, language, no matter what the mode of enunciation, was 
shot through with metaphors, metonymies and complex codifications which often masked, as 
opposed to revealed, the real self. His placing of desire at the centre of the epistemology of 
the subject – “the function of desire is a last residuum of the effect of the signifier in the 
subject. Desidero is the Freudian cogito
25” – has led to a revision of the primacy of reason in 
the human sciences.  
Given the nature of the French public sphere, Lacan, in his psychoanalytic seminars, 
felt free to discuss the events of May 1968. He referred to Raymond Aron’s
 
20 Jacques Derrida, De la Grammatologie, Paris, Minuit, 1967; Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, London, Johns Hopkins Press, 1976.  
21 Michel de Certeau, La Prise de Parole: pour une nouvelle culture, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1968. 
22 Jean-Michel Rabaté, Jean-Michel, « 68 + 1: Lacan's année érotique », Parrhesia 6 (2009), pp. 28-45, p. 35. 
23 Yannis Stavrakakis,  Lacan and the Political,  London, Routledge, 1999, p. 46. 
24 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977, p. 20.  
25 Ibid., p. 154. 
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critique of students’ rebelling in different campuses – Paris, Columbia, Poland – and noted 
that Aron’s article “reflects the thinking of honest people who say: it is happening 
everywhere. But in saying that, for him that means precisely everywhere they make the same 
racket.”26 Lacan notes that Aron’s reference to the globalization of the unrest is a telling 
point, but he feels that the article, while strong in style and tone, is missing out on a key 
structural point about the riots. As Rabaté notes: “the structural knot that Lacan was looking 
for would have to be situated at the hinge between knowledge and truth. Such a knot could be 
probed or assessed by psychoanalysis, since as a discourse, psychoanalysis was also 
interested in the transmission of its knowledge.
27” Here we see the public sphere in action as 
psychoanalysis, which is traditionally seen as a micro-science, focusing on the internal 
workings of single subjects, is now becoming a macro-science, analysing a whole generation 
of students. Indeed when one of the leaders of the students, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, told 
members of Lacan’s school that they could help only by throwing paving stones at the police, 
Lacan developed the idea that a paving stone could embody the notion of object petit a. The 
point is that, in the seminar:  
the sudden juxtaposition of Aron and Cohn-Bendit is remarkable: the liberal-turned-
conservative who kept denouncing the “imaginary revolution” of well-off students and their 
vain psychodrama is side by side with the activist. Lacan refused to align himself with either, 
but, facing their contradictory positions, attempted to situate their discourses in a 
psychoanalytic context28. 
In fact, Lacan’s view on revolutions was quite jaundiced, as he noted that “I would tell you 
that the aspiration to revolution has but one conceivable issue, always, the discourse of the 
master. That is what experience has proved. What you, as revolutionaries, aspire to is a 
Master. You will have one.
29” In spite of this, Lacan’s reaction to the revolutionary events 
was quite nuanced, but he was held by some as being partly responsible for the events of May 
1968 and was asked to leave the École Normale Supérieure
30
. What is most interesting is that 
matters of current social and political importance are being addressed on an intellectual level, 
without polemical or ideological bias, and in the spirit of inquiry – the public sphere in 
action. 
Michel Foucault, who saw himself as a specialist in the history of systems of thought,  
probed the nature of  knowledge itself, arguing that the different aspects
 
26 Gaogoa, Transcriptions des Séminaires de Lacan, http://gaogoa.free.fr/seminaires.htm, 15-05-1968, p. 208. 
27 Rabaté, « 68 + 1: Lacan's année érotique », p. 32. 
28 Rabaté, « 68 + 1: Lacan’s année érotique », p. 32. 
29 Jacques Lacan, Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind 
Krauss, and Annette Michelson, ed. Joan Copjec,  New York, Norton, 1990, p. 126. 
30 Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political, p. 11. 
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of what counts as knowledge in a given historical period – intellectual, cultural, political – 
form an “episteme”, and he saw the function of the historian of ideas as involving the 
disentangling of the different layers of discourse which constitutes that episteme. The 
question which he addressed in all of his work was how have the objects of my knowledge 
been produced and how have the questions I address to them been produced? This level of 
analysis of the systems through which culture expresses itself would have profound 
implications for our understanding of society in general and of Irish society, with its very 
static systems of control and organisation of knowledge, in particular. He, too, reacted to les 
événements on an intellectual level, noting that “without May 1968, I would never have done 
such investigations as those on the prison.
31” For Foucault, this prison work “provided [him] 
with the opportunity to stitch together the loose ends that had troubled me in works like the 
History of Madness or Birth of the Clinic.
32” Clearly once again major events become 
refracted in the public sphere and they give rise to different and alternate engagements in 
terms of causal factors and consequences, and this intellectual activity is part of a 
contemporary plural reaction to, and critique of, events. 
It was with this same issue of structurality that Derrida’s work was concerned, as he 
postulates that the history of any process of meaning or signification is always predicated on 
some “centre”, some validating point seen as a “full presence which is beyond play.33”  
Derrida, and perhaps specifically his neologism “deconstruction”, has become a synecdoche 
of this process of theoretical critique, and of intellectual engagement with every structure that 
exists in society. At its most basic, deconstruction consists in taking the binary oppositions 
which are constructive of the epistemological paradigm of Western philosophy and, as 
Derrida himself notes: “to deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy 
at a given moment.
34” For Derrida, the teleology of deconstructive critique involves the 
imbrication of text with context. He is unwilling to bracket any field of cultural endeavour 
within its own self-defined parameters. Deconstruction, he says, consists of “a thinking 
through of transference”, and his most “elliptical and economical” definition of 
deconstruction is “plus d’une langue – both more than a language and no more of a 
language.
35” The idea of hermetically sealed-off cultures, national languages, ideologies are 
deconstructed to reveal a broader context of comparison and contrast, a process which will 
have ramifications for any exploration of Irish social, cultural and political mores. Indeed for 
Derrida,
 
31 Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito, New York, Semiotext(e), 
1991, p. 140. 
32 Ibid., p. 139. 
33 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, London, Routledge, 1978, p. 280.  
34 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 41.  
35 Jacques Derrida, Jacques, Mémoires: For Paul de Man, trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler and Eduardo 
Cadava, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989, pp. 14-15.  
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 the public sphere is being globalized and in a joint article with Habermas, this very point is 
made, as Habermas maintains that the simultaneity of mass demonstrations that erupted 
across European  centres on 15 February 2003 to the “sneak attack” of the “coalition of the  
willing” on Iraq “may well, in hindsight, go down in history as a sign of the birth of a 
European public sphere.
36” 
Another critic, Roland Barthes, in Mythologies, applied the techniques of what had 
been hitherto for literary analysis, to a complex range of culture iconic, linguistic and visual 
signifiers, offering readings of different items of culture which laid bare the ideological 
imperatives through which their seemingly natural meanings had come into being. Barthes’s 
lucid and complex readings of phenomena as diverse as wrestling, steak, the motor car, the 
iconography of a black soldier saluting the French flag, was to become a template for future 
studies of the semiotics of culture. Barthes explained the aims of the book in terms which are 
especially significant for this paper: 
This book has a double theoretical framework: on the one hand, an ideological critique 
bearing on the language of so-called mass culture; on the other, a first attempt to analyse 
semiologically the mechanics of this language. I had just read Saussure and as a result 
acquired the conviction that by treating ‘collective representations’ as sign-systems, one 
might hope to go further than the pious show of unmasking them and account in detail for the 
mystification which transforms petit-bourgeois culture into a universal nature37. 
The book was originally published in French in 1957, and interestingly in a preface to a 
revised edition, written in 1970, Barthes goes on to critique the mode of operation of the book 
itself, making the point that he could not write it now, not because what brought it about has 
now disappeared, but because ‘ideological criticism, at the very moment when the need for it 
was again made brutally evident (May ’68), has become more sophisticated.38” The reference 
to May ’68 is important as it demonstrates that French intellectuals see themselves very much 
as writing within their public sphere, indeed, they see their writings as helping to create that 
very sphere. Writing in Image Music Text, Barthes would suggest a globalised public sphere 
avant la lettre, when he notes that: 
In an initial moment, the aim was the destruction of the (ideological) signified; in a second, it 
is that of the destruction of the sign: ‘mythoclasm’ is succeeded by a ‘semioclasm’ which is 
much more far-reaching  
 
36 Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, “February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a 
Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe”, Constellations 10.3 (2003), pp. 291–297, p. 291. 
37 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, selected and translated from the French by Annette Lavers, New York, The 
Noonday Press, 1972, p. 8. 
38 Ibid., p. 8. 
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and pitched at a different level. The historical field of action is thus widened: no longer the 
(narrow) sphere of French society but far beyond that, historically and geographically, the 
whole of Western civilization (Graeco- Judaeo-Islamo-Christian) [...] from Plato to France-
Dimanche.39 
Here we see a globalised frame of reference and of interplay; here we see a globalised public 
sphere, where debate is transnational, a public sphere that again relates to the points made by 
Derrida and Habermas. Habermas has said that the next incarnation of the public sphere 
would be “a European-wide, integrated public sphere [which] develops in the ambit of a 
common political culture: a civil society encompassing interest associations, 
nongovernmental organizations, citizens’ movements.40” 
 
 
Is there an Irish public sphere? 
 
Clearly, to return to Intellectual Impostures, the notion that this level of social critique is that 
of intellectual imposters is a point that is very much open to debate, but what is fascinating to 
an Irish reader about this book is that some thirty years after the books mentioned in the 
opening section of this essay, the theoretical public sphere of French intellectual activity had 
become such a “given” that there can be a debate about the aspects of intellectual activity that 
are seen as challenging.  Although some French historians have shed a somewhat different 
light on the role of French intellectuals in the 1960s
41, the “events” of 1968, which we have 
been looking at, were culture and epoch-defining in French society, and as such, were part of 
the public sphere. However, in recent years in Ireland there have been a number of “events” 
which have had similar seismic effects on Irish society and culture. I would argue that had we 
a defined public sphere in Ireland, then these “events” could form the genesis of systemic and 
structural change in terms of the future of Irish society. 
The ongoing war in Northern Ireland, which resulted in the deaths of some 3,600 
people was carried out under the aegis of the Provisional IRA, who saw themselves as part of 
a republican tradition that stretched back to Wolfe Tone and Robert Emmet. Gerry Adams 
has frequently contextualised the PIRA campaign in the overall context of the rebellions of 
1798, 1848 and 1916, and has used these as a form of political and ethical warrant for the 
bombing campaigns
 
39 Roland Barthes, Image Music Text, essays selected and translated by Stephen Heath, London, Fontana, 1977, 
p. 84. 
40 Jürgen Habermas, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? A Response to Dieter Grimm”, The Inclusion of the 
Other: Studies in Political Theory, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1998, pp. 155–161, p. 160. 
41 For a recent reappraisal of this vexed issue, see Jean-François Sirinelli, Mai 68 – L’événement Janus, Paris, 
Fayard, 2008, pp. 243-44 (“Intellectuels en sourdine”). 
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 in Northern Ireland and on mainland Britain. There has been comparatively little discussion 
of this narrative structuring of republicanism in Irish intellectual circles. Indeed, there is 
almost a revised revisionism coming about as republicanism is being seen as a valid form of 
political ideology in an Irish context without ever having its epistemological position 
unpacked. Given that the aims of provisional Sinn Fein are similar to those of the IRA, 
namely a 32-county united Ireland, and given that the largest political party in Ireland, and 
the one which has been in almost continuous government since 1932, Fianna Fáil, shares this 
aim, and further given that the subtitle of Fianna Fáil is “The Republican Party”, one would 
expect that the epistemology of Irish republicanism would be the subject of ongoing debate in 
an Irish public sphere but one would be wrong. Here, the value of an intellectual 
consideration of this grand narrative would have significant ramifications for people’s 
attitudes to the “republicanism” of each of these parties. 
In June of 2009, the Ryan Report was released which outlined and detailed levels of 
institutional abuse of children in church-run institutions over a period of some fifty years.  
With an “unconditional apology”, the Congregation of the Sisters of Mercy said:  
We accept that many who spent their childhoods in our orphanages or industrial schools were 
hurt and damaged while in our care. We are mindful of all who, as children, were cared for by 
us in our institutions. We know that it is a very painful time for you as you read the findings 
of this report. It is a very difficult time for our sisters and our lay staff who gave long service 
in caring for children in our residential institutions. There is a great sadness in all of our 
hearts at this time and our deepest desire is to continue the healing process for all involved42.    
The Conference of Religious in Ireland (CORI) acknowledged “the pain and hurt experienced 
by many”. CORI went on to add that “most importantly, all of us must now make certain that 
we continue to learn from the past by ensuring that all vulnerable people are provided with 
quality care which respects their needs and dignity and reflects the compassion of Christ.
43” 
These are fine words, but the “unconditional” nature of the apology was called into question 
by the deal which the religious orders involved did with the state, in the shape of government 
minister Michael Woods, which indemnified them against financial reparations. That the 
orders would seek to negotiate these reparations is certainly at odds with any true sense of 
regret or responsibility and one would think that in a public sphere, there would be questions 
raised as to state support of these orders in terms of teaching salaries or capitation grants or 
indeed of the value and correctness of  
 
42 The Irish Examiner, May 21st, 2009. 
43 The Irish Examiner, May 21st, 2009. 
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their continuing role in the education and care of the young, given the range and systemic 
nature of the abuse and of the subsequent ongoing campaigns of avoidance of blame for that 
abuse. Some over 800 known abusers in over 200 institutions during a period of 35 years 
have been identified in terms of having committed acts of violence, sexual oppression and 
criminal assault on the children in these homes but because of an immunity deal, none of 
these will be named and none of these will be prosecuted. Without a valid and energised 
public sphere, there is merely a journalistic flurry which is time-dependent and as soon as the 
next story comes along, then discussion is shelved and there is neither democratic 
accountability nor responsibility in the case of these actions. 
One of the main images left in the mind after two days reporting of brutality was of a 
twelve-year-old boy in one of the institutions who was being so badly beaten on a second 
floor landing that he fell over the banisters and died. The fact that no-one will be charged for 
this act is a very real indictment of church and state in this country, but in the absence of 
ongoing critique, it is one which, like Freud’s repetition complex, is destined to be repeated 
again and again, in different aspects of Irish life. We have seen this in the Irish socio-political 
system in recent times. Despite serious inappropriate, and possibly illegal, behaviours in our 
banking system, none of the major players has suffered in any way. The AGMs of the banks, 
while a little heated, still elect the same boards of executive and non-executive directors, and 
the shareholders still have to accept their losses while the institutions are underwritten to the 
tune of billions by the taxpayers – very often those same shareholders. There are very few 
voices of critique here – the general opinion of commentators is that while this is unfair and 
unjust, the banks are structurally necessary to the economy and so must be kept in business.  
The Gardai did enter Anglo-Irish bank and took away a number of documents and computers, 
but one imagines there will be no need to rush through the building of the new Clover Hill 
Prison to house the directors of Anglo after they are charged and convicted. The same is true 
of the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA) which will attempt to buy up the bad 
debts of the banks and thus absolve the Banks, their bondholders and shareholders of all 
fiscal responsibility and instead the taxpayers of Ireland will assume the debts over the 
coming years. 
There is little or no public debate among intellectuals about these matters and the 
results are that the system is able to batten down the hatches while the media discuss the 
initial news-bite and then the furore dies down and things move along in the usual fashion. 
The narrative is dictated from the top of the system and the lack of a discernible public sphere 
is an eloquent silence in the Ireland of today. In postmodern Ireland (and I use this term 
chronologically as opposed to intellectually), the overriding emotion towards metanarratives 
is one of acceptance, and hence we are not truly postmodern in the sense described
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 by Lyotard, when he defined postmodernism as an “incredulity toward metanarratives.44”  
Republicanism, religion, governmental structures and the banking system – all of these need 
to be offered to ongoing critique in a public sphere in a manner parallel to that of the French 
public sphere.  It is to be hoped that intellectuals in Ireland will take up the torch that has 
been kept alight for so long by French intellectuals and it would be a significant mark of 
progress in the creation of such public sphere if a book by Irish authors criticising Irish 
intellectual imposters were to be published because it would be a significant marker of the 
achievement of a public sphere in Ireland.  And if we are to develop as a society, and deal 
with all of the problems of the twenty first century, such a sphere is necessary. Ireland is 
well-equipped technologically-speaking to initiate a public sphere.  The media, cyberspace, 
mobile technology, the blogsphere and electronic journals will all have a part to play in the 
global public sphere, but it is not enough to just have the technology because “the public 
sphere must not itself be ‘subverted by power’, whether that of  large organizations or the 
mass media.
45” In Habermas’s “two-track” view of democratic law-making, formally 
institutionalized deliberation and decision-making must be open to input from informal 
public spheres. This means that the political must not become an autonomous system, 
operating solely according to its own criteria of efficiency  and unresponsive to citizen 
concerns, nor should it become subservient  to particular interests that have access to 
administrative power through  unofficial paths of influence that by-pass the democratic 
process
46
. The intellectual imposters contretemps was an example, albeit a negative one, of 
the strength of the French public sphere – in Ireland, we should be so lucky! 
 
 
 
 
 
44 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and 
Brian Massumi, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, p. xxiv. 
45 William Rehg, “Translator’s Introduction”, in Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 1996, pp. ix–xxxix, pp. 
xxxi–ii. 
46 Pauline Johnson, Habermas: Rescuing the Public Sphere, London,  Routledge, 2006,  p. 92. 
